Abstract. We study liveness and safety in the context of CCS extended with communicating transactions, a construct we recently proposed to model automatic error recovery in distributed systems. We show that fair-testing and may-testing capture the right notions of liveness and safety in this setting, and argue that must-testing imposes too strong a requirement in the presence of transactions. We develop a sound and complete theory of fair-testing in terms of CCS-like tree failures and show that, compared to CCS, communicating transactions provide increased distinguishing power to the observer. We also show that weak bisimilarity is a sound, though incomplete, proof technique for both may-and fairtesting. To the best of our knowledge this is the first semantic treatment of liveness in the presence of transactions. We exhibit the usefulness of our theory by proving illuminating liveness laws and simple but nontrivial examples.
Introduction
The correctness of distributed systems can to a large extent be specified in terms of its safety and liveness properties. In the presence of some form of built-in fault tolerance, such as support for transactions, the verification of safety properties is simplified but the verification of liveness properties becomes more subtle.
In previous work [18] we defined the novel language construct of communicating transactions, which drops the isolation requirement of classical transactions and models automatic error recovery of distributed communicating systems. We gave a high-level semantics of communicating transactions in a calculus called TransCCS, an extension of CCS, and developed a compositional theory for this calculus based on may-testing preorder.
May-testing can be used to reason about safety [10] . The intuition of safety is that "nothing bad will happen" [14] . A safety property can be formulated as a safety test T ; which detects and reports the bad behaviour on a channel ;. We say that a process P passes a safety test if (P | T ; ) cannot report on ;. An implementation I then preserves the safety properties of a specification S if I passes all the safety tests of S (i.e. S ∼may I).
Let us briefly consider in a value-passing version of TransCCS a simple distributed communication system Sys that implements the specification
Spec rec,del = rec(x).del x .0
The implementation uses restarting communicating transactions. A restarting transaction is written as µX. P k X and executes its default P , allowing it to communicate with the environment of the transaction, until P commits the transaction by executing a co k or the runtime non-deterministically aborts the transaction. In the latter case the effects of P to the environment are automatically rolled-back. The system uses a one-place queue, with Src storing the value received on rec as an output on q, if the current size of the queue, stored in s, is 0; Trg conveys the value from q to del , if the queue is not empty. Both Src and Trg rely on an abort to undo the input on s if their condition is not satisfied.
As discussed, Sys is a safe implementation of Spec if Spec ∼may Sys. This would guarantee that an observer testing for a violation of the safety property that the received and delivered values match,
can not report ; with Sys because it can not report this with Spec.
The intuition of liveness is that "something good will eventually happen". As for safety properties, a liveness property can be formulated as a liveness test T ω which detects and reports the good behaviour on a channel ω. For example, such a test for the above system would be T ω = ω + rec v .del (x).ω which tests for the property that if an input is ever received on rec we eventually get an output on del . The definition of passing a liveness test however is delicate. One possibility, corresponding to must-testing [9] , is to require that every schedule (i.e. computation) of (Sys | T ω ) reports success of the test. A restarting transaction can however be aborted by the runtime system infinitely often, even though at every point in the schedule the transaction can follow a path to a commit. In such, admittedly pathological, schedules no restarting transaction can guarantee liveness: in (Sys | T ω ), after the value is received on rec, infinite aborts of Trg will prevent the value from being delivered on del , and the test will not succeed along this schedule. Indeed, under this scheme there would be no difference between Sys and the process µX.τ.X, as neither can guarantee any liveness properties.
A more useful definition assumes a notion of fairness, and considers only schedules where every transaction that gets a chance to commit infinitely often will eventually do so [6] . We say that a process P passes a liveness test T ω if (P | T ω ) should report success on ω: that is, (P | T ω ) will eventually ring under a fair scheduler. As we will see, this definition of passing a liveness test leads to fair-testing [17] .
With that definition we can show that Sys is a live implementation of Spec: Sys passes all the liveness tests of Spec (i.e. Spec ∼fair Sys). This is a non-trivial property of Sys which implies, among others, that relying on the abort of the transactions to restore the output on s when the conditions of Src and Trg are not satisfied does not introduce any deadlocks.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
1. We study liveness and safety in a concurrent language with communicating transactions and show that these notions are captured respectively by fair-testing and may-testing. To the best of our knowledge this is the first semantic treatment of liveness in the presence of transactions. 2. We give a characterization of liveness preservation in TransCCS in terms of so-called clean tree failures. This builds on previous results about clean traces (traces that contain only actions that will be committed), as well as newly proved properties of communicating transactions and the identification of characteristic TransCCS liveness tests. 3. We show that transactions add observational power to the observer with respect to liveness preservation and explain this through examples. 4. We define a variation on weak bisimilarity over clean traces and show that this is a sound but incomplete proof technique for safety and liveness. 5. We exhibit the usefulness of our theory by illuminating laws and examples.
The language, reduction semantics, and LTS of TransCCS, as well as results about may-testing are reused from [18, 19] . We do not assume, however, that the reader is familiar with our previous work on TransCCS. Due to limited space some of the proofs can be found in an appendix.
Syntax and Reduction Semantics of TransCCS
The syntax and the reduction semantics of TransCCS are shown in Fig. 1 ; as usual a ranges over a set of actions Act on which is defined a bijective function ( · ) : Act → Act, used to formalize communication, and µ ranges over Act τ , the set Act augmented with a new action τ , used to represent internal activity. We use the standard abbreviations for CCS terms.
TransCCS extends CCS with the constructs P k Q which denotes a transaction, and co k which commits transaction k. The transaction runs its default P , which replaces the transaction in the case of a commit. The alternative Q replaces the transaction in the case of a non-deterministic abort. The occurrences of k in P are bound by the transaction; after a commit any remaining free co k behave as the nil process. Fig. 2 shows some simple examples of transactions. We will refer to these examples throughout the paper.
Reduction Rules (→) is the least relation that satisfies
and is closed under the contexts C ::
Structural equivalence (≡) contains the usual rules for parallel and hiding. A transaction can communicate with a process R in its environment by embedding R in its default and alternative (R-Emb). This simple but important operation allows the default of the transaction to interact with R. Example 1. Consider transaction S ab in parallel with the test T ω ab = a.b.ω. After an embedding step, the transaction can communicate with the process; both will be restored to their original state in the case of an abort. The possible traces are summarized in the following graph.
Liveness
We now formalize liveness as described in the introduction. A process P (typically the parallel composition of a test and a process-under-test) can output on a channel ω, written P ⇓ ω if it can reach a top-level ω after some internal steps:
We are interested only in top-level occurrences of ω, because an output that is still inside a transaction may still be undone.
A process P passes a liveness test T ω if it cannot reach a state from which the test cannot detect the good behaviour.
Definition 2 (Passing Liveness Tests).
A process P passes a liveness test
Example 2. Transaction S ab passes the liveness test T ω ab = a.b.ω even though it may keep aborting. S ab would not pass this test with the stronger definition of liveness, which would not ignore this pathological schedule (cf. must-testing [9] ).
The reduction graph of S | T ω ab was shown in Ex. 1. Although there are infinite aborting paths, at no point does the system reach a state in which the ab actions have become impossible. This is not true for transaction I 1 :
Transaction I 2 also fails the liveness test since the transaction never commits and the output on ω by the test therefore never becomes top-level.
Given a specification S, an implementation I preserves the liveness properties of S if every successful liveness test of S is also a successful liveness test of I. This naturally leads us to the standard definition of fair-testing [17] which here we call liveness preservation.
Definition 3 (Liveness Preservation)
. I preserves the liveness properties of S, written S ∼live I, when for all liveness tests T ω , if S shd T ω then I shd T ω . We write S live I if S ∼live I and I ∼live S.
Example 3. We saw in Ex. 2 that S ab passes the test T ω ab and that neither I 1 nor I 2 does. It follows immediately that S ab ∼live I 1 and S ab ∼live I 2 .
Example 4. We will formally prove S ab ∼live I 3 after we develop our theory of liveness. Here we note only that I 3 shd T 
We can see that P passes this test by the reduction graph of P | T ω (a,bd) :
The restarting transaction makes it possible to restore the choice b.c + b.d if the wrong branch of P communicates on b. However, Q does not pass this test:
In TransCCS, unlike CCS, the point of internal choice is important with respect to liveness preservation.
To see that τ.a.P +τ.a.Q ∼live a.P +a.Q consider the processes R 1 = τ.a.c+τ.a.d and R 2 = a.c + a.d and the liveness test
Proposition 3 (Compositionality Laws). If P ∼live P and Q ∼live Q then:
These laws can be proven using our characterization of liveness preservation in Sect. 6. As in CCS [17] , however, recursive contexts do not preserve ( ∼live ), as illustrated in the next example.
Example 6 (Fault tolerance). Consider the processes P = a + τ and Q = 0. P can be thought of as a process with a fault: it may do an a action or it may get stuck. Any liveness test that P passes can therefore not rely on the a action, and hence we have P ∼live Q. However, consider the context
This context adds fault tolerance: if P faults in C[P ], the transaction can abort and try again, so that C[P ] will pass the liveness test T ω b = b.ω. However, Q never does the a action, so the addition of fault tolerance makes no difference; in particular,
Safety
As discussion in the introduction, a safety test T ; is a process that tests and reports "bad" behaviour on a channel ;; a process P passes the test if P | T ; cannot output on ;:
Definition 4 (Passing Safety Tests). A process P passes a safety test T ; , written P cannot T ; , when P | T ; ⇓ ; .
Given a specification S, an implementation I preserves the liveness properties of S if every successful safety test of S is also a successful safety test of I. This leads us to the definition of safety preservation, which amounts to the inverse of the standard definition of may-testing [9] .
Definition 5 (Safety Preservation). I preserves the safety properties of S, and we write S ∼safe I, if for every safety test
Example 7. Consider the safety test T ; ab = err .; | a.b. Transaction I 3 passes this test, because there is no possibility of reaching a top-level output on ;:
At no point do we have a top-level output on ;, so that I 3 passes this test. In fact, we have that S ab ∼safe I 3 (we prove this formally in Ex. 12). I 4 however is not a safe implementation of S ab because it does not pass this test:
As we will prove by Thm. 3 in Sect. 6, liveness preservation implies safety preservation. Thus, to show that an implementation I preserves both the liveness and safety properties of a specification S, it suffices to show that S ∼live I. 
Clean Traces and Safety
We give an overview of the definitions and results we reuse from previous work [18, 19] . These involve the definition of a Labelled Transition System (LTS) that describes the traces of processes, the definition of clean traces over this LTS, and a rephrasing of results about may-testing in terms of safety.
Labelled Transition System
The LTS (Fig(s) . 3 and 4) is defined over an extended language called TransCCS • , ranged over by P, Q. Transactions in TransCCS
• are distributed as a primary transaction, denoted by P k Q , and zero or more secondary transactions, denoted by P k Q
• which correspond to embedded processes. This simulates embedding in the reduction semantics while keeping processes separate, supporting compositional reasoning. As an example, consider the trace starting with
Notice how (after unfolding the transaction once) the test is embedded and becomes a secondary transaction a.b.ω k a.b.ω • . Actions in the LTS are marked with the transactions that execute them (rule L-Trans); a primary and secondary k-transaction can communicate and therefore the action k(a) of the primary k-transaction is matched by the action k(a) of the secondary k-transaction (L-Comm), resulting in a k(τ ) action.
Consider also the trace starting with
(eliding B-Ab and B-Trans for secondary transactions)
Fig. 4. LTS: Broadcast actions
At this point, the transaction can only abort:
As in the reduction semantics, no trace of
ab leads to a top-level ;.
Clean Traces
There is an essential difference between the two traces of the previous section:
In the first, every action performed inside a transaction is eventually committed; in the second trace, however, the embedding step into the k transaction and the internal step within the k transaction are subsequently aborted and undone. Clean traces are CCS traces that correspond to raw traces in the LTS where all transactions performing actions are eventually committed at the end of the trace. Formally, clean traces are specified by the relation P t − → ∆ P , given in Fig. 5 . The parameter ∆ is used to record which transactions will commit, and hence which actions are allowed inside the trace. Usually, we care only that there is some ∆ for which P t − → ∆ P can be derived, which motivates the following definition: Definition 6. We write P t − → CL iff t is a clean trace of P, that is ∃∆, P such that P t − → ∆ P . We write P t = ⇒ CL to denote that t is a weak clean trace of P. 
Characterization of Safety as Clean Trace Inclusion
Safety preservation is characterized by clean trace inclusion [18] .
Definition 7 (Language). The language of a process P is the set of weak clean traces it can do:
Characterization of Liveness as Clean Tree Failures
We now proceed with the main technical result of this paper: a sound and complete characterization of liveness preservation in terms of clean tree failures. In this section we present the model, give a number of examples, and state the main results. The proof of soundness and completeness is summarized in Sect. 8.
The intuition of our model is that P has a clean tree failure (t, Ref ) iff P can do a clean trace to P and P cannot do any of the clean traces in the set Ref .
Definition 8 (Tree failures). Tree failures are defined as
F(P) def = {(t, Ref ) | ∃P . P t = ⇒ CL P and L(P ) ∩ Ref = ∅}
Theorem 2 (Liveness Preservation). P ∼live Q iff F(P ) ⊇ F(Q).
Example 9. Consider the transactions S ab and I 3 from Fig. 2 . The only clean traces either of these processes can do is the empty trace and the trace ab; moreover, for either process, the only clean trace that they cannot refuse after the empty trace is the trace ab, and both can refuse all clean traces after the trace ab. Hence, the set of failures for both processes is
so that by Thm. 2 we have S ab live I 3 .
Our model is simpler than the model of liveness preservation in CCS [17] . This is due to the existence of transactional tests that do not allow processes to deadlock while they communicate with these tests, as shown in Ex. 5.
As in CCS, liveness preservation implies safety preservation.
Theorem 3 (Liveness implies safety).
If P ∼live Q then P ∼safe Q.
Proof. By Thm. 1 it suffices to prove that if t is a clean trace of Q then it is a clean trace of P . Let t be a clean trace of Q; then (t, ∅) ∈ F(Q) and by Thm. 2, (t, ∅) ∈ F(P ). Thus t is a clean trace of P .
Canonical Tests
We identify a class of canonical liveness tests that encode sufficient power to distinguish any processes P and Q for which P ∼live Q. We use these tests in the definition of a restricted form of liveness preservation, which we will show by Prop. 8 in the following section implies inverse failure inclusion. This result is crucial to show completeness of our characterization, but also implies that restricted liveness coincides with standard liveness. 
These tests are interesting because (as we will show in Sect. 8) a process P passes the liveness test T 
Proof. Follows by Prop. 6 (soundness) and Prop. 8 in the following section.
Soundness and Completeness
We now outline the proof that the characterization of the fair-testing preorder in terms of clean tree failures is sound and complete. This proof makes use of the ability to zip and unzip clean traces, proved in [18, 19] , which means that processes can communicate independently of their transaction structure.
Proposition 4 (Clean unzipping). If P | Q = ⇒ CL R then there exist t, P , and Q such that P t = ⇒ CL P and Q t = ⇒ CL Q and R is equal up to merging of distributed transactions with P | Q .
Proposition 5 (Clean zipping). If P t = ⇒ CL P and Q t = ⇒ CL Q then there exists an R such that P | Q = ⇒ CL R and R is equal up to merging of distributed transactions with P | Q .
The following theorem is key in the proof of soundness and completeness, and states that we can construct clean traces from raw traces:
Theorem 5 (Clean trace construction). If P = ⇒ R then there exists R such that P = ⇒ CL R and
This theorem strengthens an earlier result [18] , where we proved (1) but not (2); the proof is however significantly different. Intuitively, the construction of the clean trace postpones all commits to the end of the trace and aborts all actions that are never committed in the raw trace.
The proof of soundness is based on the construction of a clean trace from a raw trace, and zipping and unzipping of clean traces.
Proposition 6 (Soundness
Proof. Assume F(P ) ⊇ F(Q). We prove the contrapositive of P ∼live Q: suppose ¬(Q shd T ) for some test T ; we have to show that ¬(P shd T ).
Since ¬(Q shd T ), there exists an R such that Q | T = ⇒ R ⇓ ω . Hence by Thm. 5, there exists R such that Q | T = ⇒ CL R ⇓ ω . By Prop. 4, there exist t, Q , T such that Q 
A process fails a canonical liveness test iff it has the corresponding tree failure. 
Proposition 7 (Tests and Failures
We take cases on t ∈ L ω (T (t,Ref ) ):
Not possible, because then T = ω↓ ω . 2. t = t 1 for some t 1 t 2 = t with t 2 non-empty; again, not possible because then
Restricted liveness preservation implies inverse failure inclusion.
since P ∼live Q, and finally (t, Ref ) ∈ F(P ) by Prop. 7 again.
Proof. By the definitions of ( ∼live ) and (ˆ ∼live ) and Prop. 8.
Weak Clean-Trace Bisimilarity
In this section we present a convenient coinductive proof technique for liveness preservation, which is based on weak bisimilarity over clean traces. We show that this technique is sound but not complete with respect to liveness preservation, and use it to prove liveness and safety preservation.
Definition 13 (Weak Clean-Trace Bisimulation). Θ is a weak clean-trace bisimulation if whenever (P, Q) ∈ Θ the following two conditions are satisfied.
Weak clean-trace bisimilarity, denoted by ≈, is the largest weak clean-trace bisimulation.
Weak clean-trace bisimilarity is sound with respect to both liveness and safety.
Theorem 6 (Soundness of (≈)). If P ≈ Q then P live Q and P safe Q.
Proof. Since ≈ is commutative, it suffices to prove that P ∼live Q and hence by
The following example shows that weak clean-trace bisimilarity is not complete with respect to liveness and safety. . It is not difficult to show, however, that P live Q (and thus, by Thm. 3, P may Q) by observing that any tree failure (t, S) ∈ F(P ) is a tree failure of Q and vice versa.
The next result simplifies reasoning about weak clean-trace bisimilarity by allowing us to consider a single unfolding of recursive transactions.
Proof. By enumeration of the clean traces of the restarting transactions, which start with a number of aborts and continue with a clean trace of the nonrestarting transactions.
We use weak clean-trace bisimilarity to give simple coinductive proofs of liveness and safety preservation for the examples of the introduction and Fig. 2 .
Example 12. Recall once more the two transactions S ab and I 3 from Fig. 2 . We prove that S ab live I 3 , and thus S ab may I 3 , by showing that S ab ≈ I 3 . By Prop. 9 it suffices to show that a.b.co k k 0 ≈ a.b.co k + err.0 k 0 which can be easily proved by showing that the relation containing the two transactions and (0, 0) is a bisimulation.
Example 13. We now turn our attention to the example of the introduction, which we study under a simple extension of TransCCS to value-passing. We show that the implementation Sys preserves both the liveness and safety properties of the specification Spec. In fact, we prove the stronger results that Spec live Sys and Spec safe Sys by showing that Spec ≈ Sys. Consider the relation
It is easy to verify that Θ is a weak clean-trace bisimulation.
Related work
The study of safety and liveness in concurrent languages goes back thirty years [14, 15] , but although there are many studies of (isolated) transactions in concurrent languages [1-5, 7, 11, 13] none of them study liveness. As far as we are aware, this is the first semantic study of liveness properties of transactions.
Moreover, the only other calculus that models communicating transactions that we know of is RCCS [8] . However, there are some significant differences, as explained in [18] : transactions in RCCS are not in charge of when they commit so that (using our syntax) the transaction a.0 k 0 can be distinguished from 0, even though the transaction itself never commits the a action. Moreover, we are not aware of any study of liveness of transactions in RCCS.
We studied liveness properties of communicating transactions under an assumption of fairness, which must be guaranteed by potential implementations of the language. There is some work that investigates the fairness guarantees that can be offered by implementations of isolated transactions [12, 16] ; an extension of those studies to communicating transactions would be worthwhile.
Conclusions
We studied liveness and safety in TransCCS; to the extent of our knowledge, this is the first semantic study of liveness in the presence of transactions. We showed that fair-testing and may-testing capture the right notions of liveness and safety and gave numerous examples to build useful intuitions. We developed a sound and complete characterization of liveness preservation in terms of clean tree failures, extending our earlier work on clean traces. This characterization is simpler than the characterization of liveness preservation in CCS, made possible by the additional distinguishing power added by transactions. We also gave a coinductive proof technique for liveness preservation based on weak clean trace bisimulation, which we proved to be sound but incomplete. We used the characterization and the bisimulation in example proofs of liveness preservation.
Further study of weak bisimulation and other proof techniques is future work. For instance, it is unclear at present whether bisimilarity preserves all contexts and what its characterization is. We also plan to extend TransCCS to the π-calculus. Finally, we intend to investigate the usefulness of the construct of communicating transactions in a more realistic programming language.
A Properties of Clean Traces
In appendix A.1 we recall a number of properties of clean traces that we proved before [19] . In appendix A.2 we prove that we can construct clean traces from arbitrary raw traces; although we proved such a theorem before, the theorem we prove here is stronger and uses a different construction.
A.1 Modifying Traces
Abort persistent are traces where the name of an aborted transaction is not reintroduced by an embedding action. Merging ( ) is a relation that identifies processes up to merging of same-name transactions. This relation is a strong bisimulation [19] . We write nub(t) for the clean trace obtained by the raw trace Proposition 10 (Insert committing transaction). Let n be fresh, and suppose that
The definition of P t − → ∆ R requires that the trace is local ; i.e. transaction names are not introduced by embed actions. We will also use a weaker definition without this requirement, which we write as P nl t − → ∆ P . We show that from a non-local clean trace we can always construct an equivalent local clean trace.
Lemma 4 (Localize trace). If P nl t − → ∆ P then there exists an R such that
A.2 Constructing Clean Traces
Proposition 12. If P s − → R and s is abort-persistent then there exists non-local clean t nub(s), minimal ∆, process R and set of transaction names A such that
Proof. By induction on s. The base case is trivial: take ∆ = A = ∅, t = and R = R. For the induction step, let
From the induction hypothesis we get a t, ∆ and R and A such that
We take cases on ζ.
1. Case ζ = k(µ). We distinguish a number of subcases.
(a) k ⊆ ∆. Follows from C-Act.
(b) k = k 1 , l, k 2 where k 1 ⊆ ∆, l / ∈ ∆ and l is not aborted in t. Suppose that µ = τ (the case where µ = τ is similar). Let s t be the raw trace that corresponds to the clean trace from the induction hypothesis. Then we must have
The proof is completed by
(c) k = k 1 , l, k 2 where k 1 ⊆ ∆, l / ∈ ∆ and l is aborted in t. This case is similar as the previous, except now s t = s 1 , ab l, s 2 , where the environment cannot interact with the term in [] i before the abort but can interact with it after the abort. However, since the term inside [] i is irrelevant until the abort, it doesn't make a difference to do the abort earlier.
2. Case ζ = emb k. This case is very similar to the case for k(µ), above. As before, we distinguish between k ∈ ∆ and k / ∈ ∆. (a) k ∈ ∆. Follows from C-Emb. 
The same observations that we made in the case k(µ) apply here too. Hence, we can abort the k transaction and still do the same trace s : ∈ ∆ and k is aborted in t. As for the analogous case for k(µ). 3. Case ζ = co k. Assume that there is a primary k transaction in P; the case where there are only secondary k transactions is similar, and the case where there are no k transactions in P at all is trivial. We must have P = E e l P 0 k Q 0 P i k Q i
• i∈I P j j∈J (I, J maximal, P 0 ≡ P 0 | co k) P = E e l P 0 P i i∈I P j j∈J By the induction hypothesis and Prop. 10 there exist an R R such that E e l P 0 | co
It is easy to see that
and that R ab A − −− → R . 4. Case ζ = ab k. We assume that there is at least one k transaction in P; if this is not the case, we can simply skip the abort completely. Since s is abort persistent, k is not reintroduced in the trace, and hence by minimality of ∆ we have k / ∈ ∆. The proof follows therefore from C-Ab. 
− −− → R
Since R is reachable from R, it follows that R ⇓ ω .
